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Book Review
Truth and Justification, Jürgen Habermas, edited and with translation by Barbara Fultner, MIT Press,
2003, 349pp, $40.00 (hbk) ISBN 0262083183.
Richard Rorty tells us “most Anglophone philosophers still do not take Hegel seriously.” He continues,
“… the rise of what Brandom and McDowell refer to as their ‘Pittsburg School of neo-Hegelians’ may
force them. For this school must still pass over from its Kantian to its Hegelian moment.” Habermas’s
Truth and Justification is a not so gentle challenge to the spirit of Pittsburg neo-Hegelianism. Habermas
is especially uneasy with its emphasis on discursive practices and, its sequela, an epistemic conception of
truth. It is well known that Habermas himself defended a discursive view, and the implications he here
identifies, until the late 1990s. Qualifying his own transformation, Habermas traces his philosophical
development, noting with some restrained approbation, the publication of Rorty’s seminal, Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature. Habermas writes:
When I responded to critiques of Knowledge and Human Interests in the appendix to the
paperback addition in 1973, the turn toward a postempiricist philosophy of science had already
been initiated by Thomas Kuhn. However, I had not yet fully realized the philosophical
implications of a consistent contextualism. Only six years later Richard Rorty precipitated a
pragmatic turn in epistemology, in which, despite all our differences, I was able to discern
some of my own intentions (p. 9).
Habermas thinks that the pragmatic turn transformed Kant’s transcendental problematic. Much of this
book is a serious rethinking of the so-called transcendental problem after pragmatism. Kant, Habermas
writes, “ensured the status of the unavoidable conditions of the possibility of cognition as rational and
atemporal” (p. 9). Neo-Hegelianism attacks the idealist background set aside to guarantee objectivity;
without the self-transcendent guarantees, only an “anthropocentrically contingent and perspectivally
curtailed view of the world” is spared. Defending his Kantian intuitions, Habermas thinks “… the
difference between the world and what is innerwordly, which is crucial for the architectonic of his
[Kant’s] theory, is blurred” (p. 9). Sympathetic to aspects of the pragmatic turn, Habermas sets out to
defend both (a) an ontological assumption about a mind-independent world and (b) a nonepistemic
conception of truth. However, Habermas wishes to preserve an epistemic conception of normative
rightness in the space of moral and legal theory. Much of the book is confined to an analysis of
detranscentalized Kantian position; in the last Chapter, “The Relationship between Theory and Practice
Revisited,” Habermas discusses the constitutive nature of our moral orientation and how we determine the
conditions for rational judgment formation and the reasonableness of moral action. Habermas wonders at
the fate of our realist intuitions against the linguistic turn. Noting the appeal behind the move from a
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Kantian to Hegelian moment, he thinks that our ontology faces a “contextualist challenge.” We are left
wondering “whether any sense of context-independent validity can be salvaged from the concept of truth”
(249).
We are treated to eight essays in this volume. Each can be read as a stand-alone piece, but taken
together they reveal a forceful defense of a “justification-transcendent standard for orienting
ourselves by context-independent truth-claims” (254). “Realism after the Linguistic Turn,” the first
essay, sets the tone; taken with the second essay, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy: Two
Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn,” one gets a compelling appraisal of how language
went public, and how, historically, the so-called analytic-continental divide came to characterize
twentieth century philosophy. Demonstrating grace and mastery, Habermas is able to move about
the divide without difficulty. The other essays include: “From Kant’s ‘Ideas’ of Pure reason to the
‘Idealizing’ Presuppositions of Communicative Action: Reflections on the Detranscendentalized
‘Use of Reason’,” “From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of
Language,” “From Kant to Hegel and Back Again: The Move Toward Detranscendentalization,”
“Norms and Values: On Hilary Putnam’s Kantian Pragmatism,” “Rightness versus Truth: On the
Sense of Normative Validity in Moral Judgments and Norms,” and “The Relationship Between
Theory and Practice Revisited.”
Habermas, in this volume, is a philosopher of record. His discussions of Brandom’s very important
Making it Explicit and of Putnam, of Humboldt’s central place along side Frege in the rise of our
linguistic orientation, capture nicely the new divide; we are no longer analytical and continental
philosophers—though, of course, we are. Rather, if Habermas is correct, our divisions are preserved
by whether our affinities are Kantian or Hegelian.
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